[1] In fact, Goodman does not consider this to be representation, a term he reserves for pictorial systems that are semantically dense and replete in the senses discussed below. In his terms, we are speaking here of denotation, but we will continue to use "representation" in the way that is now conventional.

[2] This account of why pictorial understanding does not depend on resemblance appears strikingly different from Goodman's claim in Languages of Art that pictures are in fact highly conventional and depend on the application of rules.

[3] Arrows or a similar device would have to be added to capture directedness, since this is normally also shown implicitly by the vertical dimension.

[4] Though, as we observed earlier, many diagrams are notational.

⁵ Files speaks of the "behavioural dispositions" of the interpreting agent; I suppose all relevant such dispositions (if nothing else) to fall under the term use.

⁶ Recall that, for Goodman, to comply with a symbol is to be denoted by it.

[7] Ignoring the complication that this is clearly metaphorical.

[8] Even with autological words, as in the examples above, there is usually some aspect of the structure, sound or orthography of the word that is exploited. Exceptions may be e.g. "recondite" or "meaningful", which perhaps serve as samples of their own function rather than structure.

[9] Unwanted implicatures arise, for example, when users of a representation may read more into it than is intended. Cf. [17].

[10] Though if we assume there did, we can avoid many of Goodman's nominalistic contortions associated with fictive labels.